>Some (anecdotal) evidence seems to suggest that the public distribution system, especially in the border regions, is breaking down…

- Apparently, the PDS has been revitalized all across the country after 2003. It can break down again only if the government is collapsing or there is nothing to distribute. So far, these do not seem to be the case.

> …and as this happens, the jangmadang are increasingly filling this gap.

- This is why the “farmers’ markets” (jangmadang) were officially permitted in 2002-2003 virtually in every district and village. Moreover, after the 2005 crackdown on private selling activity, people still trade and speculate but discreetly, at night. The authorities know about that but seldom react.

> Imaginably, some of this food, especially up in the border areas, is imported from China. Assuming a large percentage of the food in that region is imported from China, wouldn’t that drive up prices in the region ?

- Food (and other goods) come from China as the result of barter (non-cash) deals with North Koreans. The food prices are growing, so the prices on the commodities which North Korea is exporting.

>(Also, due to predicted food shortages locally-produced food prices will no doubt rise as well).

- Yes, in jangmadangs the food prices rise and fall seasonally. But the prices on food sold through the PDS is likely to stay at the same level. PDS remains for the central government an important stabilizing factor which buys it time to look for survival paths.

>And as those traders start accumulating power and money and coalesce together, is it possible that this could contribute to the formation of “fiefdoms” along the border area that are autonomous and able to resist the central government?

- This process began in the early 2000s, when economic freedoms were hardly controlled from the centre. After 2005, when Pyongyang gained momentum, many of the freedoms associated with “7.1 economic measures” were curtailed. Recently, the government began to crack down on collective property on the means of production (trucks, buses, machinery) to undermine their ability to earn cash and barter.

And, the most important, you cannot “resist the central government” in societies like North Korea unless you feel suicidal…

LP

That’s an interesting perspective. I have a question though: Some (anecdotal) evidence seems to suggest that the public distribution system, especially in the border regions, is breaking down, and as this happens, the jangmadang are increasingly filling this gap. Imaginably, some of this food, especially up in the border areas, is imported from China. Assuming a large percentage of the food in that region is imported from China, wouldn’t that drive up prices in the region ? (Also, due to predicted food shortages locally-produced food prices will no doubt rise as well). And as those traders start accumulating power and money and coalesce together, is it possible that this could contribute to the formation of “fiefdoms” along the border area that are autonomous and able to resist the central government?

I know there are a lot of assumptions in that.But, any thoughts?

On the contrary, the soaring grain prices may help North Korean become a net exporter of grain, raising the badly needed foreign exchange. If needed, a single directive from Pyongyang can make the whole country switching from rice and corn to potato and beans.

LP